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Abstract: Almost from the weak inception of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 
in 1947, the community of trade delegates and representatives that negotiated its provisions began to 
carefully reinforce it, with considerable creativity. From a so-called “accidental organization”, without 
proper institutional structure and under provisional application for decades, old-school trade diplomats, 
and trade lawyers subsequently, managed to progressively devise a powerful treaty-based regime and thus 
a critical infrastructure for international economic interdependence. The history of the GATT and now 
the WTO can be better understood by exploring the changing roles granted to diplomacy and law within.
Keywords: Regime-building, Havana Charter, ITO, ICITO, GATT, MTN rounds, world trade his-
tory, trade diplomacy, WTO.
Resumen: Tras la creación del fragil Acuerdo General de Aranceles y Comercio (GATT) en 1947, 
la comunidad de delegados y representantes comerciales empezó a reforzarlo cuidadosamente, con crea-
tividad. Desde la denominada “organización accidental”, sin una estructura institucional apropiada y 
bajo aplicación provisional durante décadas, los diplomáticos del comercio de la vieja escuela, y los 
juristas comerciales posteriormente, se las arreglaron para dar forma progresivamente a un poderoso 
régimen convencional y, por tanto, una infraestructura crítica de la interdependencia económica global. 
La historia del GATT y ahora la OMC puede entenderse mejor explorando los cambiantes roles que ha 
tenido en su interior, a lo largo del tiempo, la diplomacia y el derecho.
Palabras clave: Carta de la Habana, ITO, ICITO, GATT, Rondas comerciales, historia del comer-
cio mundial, diplomacia commercial, OMC.
Summary: I. Diplomacy by design. II. The rule-based system. III. Inventing adjudication. 
IV. The “legal barbarians”. V. The Quest for hard-law.
I. Diplomacy by design 
1. The building of an international regime for world trade took a long and somewhat tortuous 
path, beginning in the summer of 1944, as the Second World War was finally coming to an end. It was at 
that time that the Charters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Reconstruc-
tion and Development Bank (the World Bank) were designed in order to create an institutional structure 
for economic relations in the post-war period (Bretton Woods Conference). At the time, the negotiators 
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hoped to establish an international organization which would progressively eliminate trade barriers.1 
The initiative was a reaction against the protectionism of the interwar period, and thus the impact of so-
called beggar-my-neighbor policies.2 
2. The first policy proposal on the need for regime-building in the area of world trade was a 
United States government report issued in February 1945 (Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and 
Employment), which formally placed on the global public agenda the idea of creating an international 
organization specifically focused on reducing protectionism.3 By October of the following year, the 
United States had already submitted a detailed proposal for the constitution of this new organization to 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). At its first meeting in February 1946, the 
ECOSOC brought up the idea of this ‘Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization of the 
United Nations’,4 and unanimously adopted a resolution to convene a United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Employment. The conference, finally held in Havana between November 1947 and March 
1948, would begin diplomatic negotiations to create an International Trade Organization (ITO).5
3. As a result, three preparatory conferences were held in London, New York and Geneva. Du-
ring the London meetings (October and November 1946), a draft Charter was debated and drawn up, 
based on the original proposal by the US. At the same time, it was agreed to negotiate tariff reductions 
at the next meeting and a specific treaty framework was planned to safeguard these results. In the New 
York meeting, early in 1947, that instrument building on provisions in the draft Charter was drawn up 
under the title of ‘General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (GATT).6 
4. Thus, the preparatory conference in Geneva continued to work on the draft Charter (also 
known as Havana Charter) while pursuing the tariff negotiations at the same time. The reasons for this 
strategy were basically dependent on domestic US politics; at that time, the viability of the ITO as an 
international organization faced obstacles due to the internal political tensions between the US exe-
cutive and legislative branches. Under the US Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, in essence, 
Roosevelt’s government was authorized by Congress to conclude trade agreements, but not to set up 
international organizations. Thus, as the Havana Charter faced an uncertain future,7 the GATT text was 
envisioned as an interim arrangement in the wake of the uncertain ITO ratification, but had to exclude 
all organizational elements from its provisions. 
5. Finally, 23 founding contracting parties endorsed the GATT in 30 October 1947, together with 
schedules containing the tariff reductions and tariff bindings. These schedules covered some 45,000 
tariff concessions and about $10 billion in trade. Both the form and substance of the GATT also drew 
heavily on the US bilateral trade agreements, particularly post-1935 trade agreements.8 The GATT ente-
red into force through a protocol of provisional application even before the United Nations Conference 
had ended, in 1 January 1948. The Protocol of Provisional Application contained a clause that provided 
1  r. gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (Clarendon Press) at 31. 
2  T. Flory, Le GATT. Droit International et commerce mondial, LGDJ, 1968, at 2–3.
3  W. Diebold, ‘The End of the ITO’, Essays in International Finance, n.16,1952, 3. 
4  Doc U.N. EPCT/CII/1-66 (1946).<}0{>Doc U.N. EPCT/CII/1-66 (1946).<0}
5  J. Viner, ‘Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter’, 25 Foreign Affairs (1947): 612–628.
6  J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT. A Legal Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (The 
Boobs-Merrills Company Inc 1969) at 43. 
7  For a detailed account of the ITO negotiations see, in particular, S. Aaronson, Trade and the American Dream: A Social 
History of Postwar Trade Policy (University Press of Kentucky 1996). For the specific diplomatic history within ITO negotia-
tions giving rise to the GATT (and precise explanations on why it took its particular shape and form) see D. Irving, P. Mavroidis 
& A.Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge University Press 2008).
 G. curZon & V. curZon, ‘GATT: “Traders´ Club”’, The Anatomy of Influence. Decision Making in International Organiza-
tion (Yale University Press 1974) at 313.
8  R. Hudec. ‘The GATT legal system, op.cit.p.616.
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for Part II to be applied ‘to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation’.9 The underlying 
reason for this haste was again due to domestic US politics, as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
granted the executive a congressional authorization to negotiate trade agreements (renewable for three 
year periods) which was about to expire. 
6. The Final Act authenticating the text of the Havana Charter was signed in March 1948 by 53 
countries,10 covering a wide range of issues that had never before been tackled by any previous econo-
mic diplomatic conference.11 However, unlike the trade policy provisions, the chapters on employment 
policy, economic development, commodity agreements and restrictive business practices, were relati-
vely new matters and, paraphrasing Robert Hudec, did not rest on the same degree of consensus.12 In any 
case, whhile waiting for the subsequent and unclear ratification of the Charter, an Interim Commission 
for the International Trade Organization (ICITO) was created, as an ad hoc secretariat for the weak new 
trade scheme, moving from Lake Placid (New York) to Geneva. This interim UN subsidiary body, ba-
sed at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, would play a crucial role in GATT regime-building, under the 
critical leadership of Eric Wyndham White (1947-1968),13 its first ‘Executive Director’.14 The ICITO 
was to be a cornerstone of the GATT from the moment that trade delegates and diplomats realized that 
ratifications of the Charter were not going to materialize. In practice, the project of a rule-based multi-
lateral trade regime was kept alive thanks to that minimal institutional structure and the notable indivi-
duals working within it. Thus, with the passing of years, the ICITO staff ended up becoming de facto the 
GATT secretariat.15  With the help of the people from the ICITO, in fact, the GATT Contracting Parties 
went on to organize their first two rounds of tariff negotiations in the following two years (Annecy 1949 
and Torquay 1950), inaugurating the famous GATT MTN Rounds, 
7. In December 1950, the US government finally made public its decision not to submit the ITO 
Charter to the US Congress for ratification. The decision paralyzed the ratification processes in a context 
in which the United States had become the major political and economic power of the post-war inter-
national order.  Consequently, pragmatic solutions were sought to give the GATT a certain institutional 
structure somehow. Making a virtue of necessity, article XXV entitled ‘Joint Action of the Contracting 
Parties’ became the focus around which a minimum organic structure would be cautiously built for the 
GATT to function. Interestingly, this provision enabled trade representatives to create an organization 
from almost nothing. In practice, a new body was invented, under the noun ‘CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES’, written in capital letters to differentiate from the Contracting Parties taken as individuals. The 
open wording of Article XXV transformed the provision into the ideal legal basis for progressively 
shaping a wide institutional structure: 
‘The Representatives of the contracting parties shall meet from time to time for the purpose of gi-
ving effect to those provisions of this Agreement which involve joint action and, generally, with a view to 
facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement’. 
9  For the efforts of the GATT Secretariat in 1965 to propose that governments undertake ‘definitive’ instead of ‘provisional’ 
acceptance but with reservation from pre-existing legislation see GATT Doc L/2375 (5 March 1965).
10  See UN Doc E/Conf2/78, Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (24 March 1948).
11  W. clayton, ‘Foreword’, in C.Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade, op.cit.p.vii. 
12  R. Hudec, ‘The GATT legal system, op.cit.p.620.
13  Following Francine McKenzie, there can be few heads of international organizations who rival Wyndham White for the 
widespread high regard in which he was held. See F. McKenzie, IO BIO, Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of 
International Organizations (13 March 2012).  
14  White became the first Executive-Secretary for the ICITO. The title for the position progressively changed as the non-or-
ganization developed, under his leadership. Thus, in 1957, White became Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties of 
GATT in 1957. A few years later, in 1960, the title would change again to Director General of the Contracting Parties of the 
GATT. See J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT. A Legal Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (The 
Boobs-Merrills Company Inc 1969) at 148–150.
15  J. Jackson, World Trading System: Law and policy of international economic relations (MIT Press 1989) at 37.
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8. Paradoxically, clinging to this raft, the Contracting Parties acting jointly as CONTRACTING 
PARTIES would manage to intelligently overcome a weak institutional framework.16 Not surprisingly, 
the project led by the ICITO Secretariat faced a complicated and drawn out process. In any case, howe-
ver, the regular meetings of trade representatives (the so-called ‘Sessions’) were able to slowly and con-
sensually set up the minimum structure for managing the GATT, and thus for keeping regime-building 
going. This was a period of great uncertainty, a time of cautious and careful experimentation in filling in 
the gaps in the institutional deficiencies of the GATT regime. 
9. It would take some time for the US Congress to legitimize the GATT. At the 1951 extension 
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, a section read as follows: ‘The enactment of this Act shall 
not be construed to determine or indicate the approval or disapproval by the Congress of the Executive 
Agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’. In these difficult circumstances, the 
ICITO Secretariat de facto became the GATT ‘Secretariat’ and provided the strategic impetus for deve-
loping its basic organic structure.17 
10. Given this state of affairs, the CONTRACTING PARTIES created the Ad hoc Committee 
for Agenda and Inter-Sessional Business in its ninth session of 1951.18  The Committee met some weeks 
(from four to six) prior to the meetings of the former in order to compose the collective agenda. For the 
purpose of regime-building, interestingly, joint decisions were adopted and a voting system was allowed 
whereby the voters’ presence was not required, as mail and telegraph were permitted as a means of vo-
ting. At last, once it was certain that the ITO Charter would never enter into force, all that remained for 
trade delegates was to push for institutionalization by progressively developing the Ad Hoc Committee. 
In practice, the Committee would become the ‘guardian’ of the GATT in subsequent decades and, in 
fact, it led to the establishment in 1960 of the GATT Council of Representatives, as the permanent GATT 
body to undertake work between the regular sessions of the Contracting Parties.19 
11. However, the trade diplomats who negotiated in Havana did not give up their efforts to ob-
tain full international legal personality for the GATT. Thus, these trade representatives renegotiated and 
drew up a second Charter proposal for an Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC) in the ninth mee-
ting period from October 1954 to March 1955.20 This initiative also fell by the wayside; and it therefore 
became clear to the GATT community that the only viable strategy for slowly extending the organiza-
tional fabric was to create a highly professional Secretariat, and begin operations by establishing some 
working groups and committees under a common agenda. As a result, the post of Executive Secretary 
was finally created in 1955, an office that was already being informally held in any case by Wyndham 
White since his early days at the ICITO. The game played under his leadership remained focused on 
slow and cautious regime-building,21 in a complex policy context in which ECOSOC had become a 
forum for GATT’s detractors in a widely endorsed resolution aiming at studying alternatives to GATT 
which would be adopted a year later.22
16  See J. Jackson, The World Trade and the law, op.cit.pp.132-136, J. Jackson, The World Trading System, op.cit.p.90 and 
J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and jurisprudence (RIIA 1998) at 83-84.
17  See R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the GATT Secretaríat in the Evolution of the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure’, The 
Uruguay Round and Beyond. Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel (Springer 1998) at 105 and J. Jackson, The World Trading 
System, op.cit.p.37.
18  BISD II (1952) p.205. 
19  BISD 9S /17-20 (1961).
20  See K. Dam, The GATT: law and international economic organization (1970) at 337–338.
21  See W. eckes, ‘In Globalization, People Matter: Eight who shaped the World Trading System’, 4 Global Economy Jour-
nal (2000): 303–314. 
22  See World Economic Situation: Measures for the Development of Trade Co-operation, 22nd Session, UN Doc E/AC.6/
L160 (28 July 1956) as well as Summary Record of 206th Meeting of the Economic Committee, ECOSOC Doc E/AC.6/SR.206 
(30 July 1956), in particular. 
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12. The Executive Secretary was to play a critical role in building bridges among delegations, 
in order to progressively build up the whole infrastructure, mandate and legitimacy of the accidental 
organization.23 As Kenneth Dam portrays him, ‘at every major turning point and in every major success 
in GATT history has figured an imaginative compromise, an unexpected initiative, or a face-saving for-
mula originated by Wyndham White’. In the words of Braithwaite and Drahos, by the time he retired in 
1968, with the title of DG of the GATT, ‘he had forged an unconstitutional, temporary GATT into the 
most powerful, entrenched non-organization the world had seen’.24 Illustratively, right at the beginning 
of the 60s, Wyndham White was framing the GATT in the following terms: 
‘The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as its name clearly indicates, is, juridically speaking, 
a trade agreement and nothing more. But because it is a multilateral agreement and contains provisions 
for joint action and decision it had the potentiality to become, and has in fact become, an international 
‘organization’ for trade cooperation between the signatory States’.25
13. Thus, a workable GATT regime was already in place, and would be carefully nurtured by a 
small community of trade diplomats and technocrats. From there to the signing of the WTO agreement 
in April 1994, four fascinating decades of regime-building would get underway. To paraphrase Kenneth 
Dam, the GATT was the humblest if not the neediest of the many international bodies on the world 
scene; yet in terms of success it ranks among the highest achievers: this initial disadvantage was largely 
overcome thanks to the persistence of a dedicated and pragmatic Secretariat, with the remarkable help, 
political will and leadership of key Contracting Parties such as the US.26 In practice, despite the fact that 
it was not an international organization at the outset, the GATT gradually evolved to become a strong 
regime in its own terms. 
14. In the interim, it operated precariously for almost half a century. In order for GATT to have 
entered into force, the instruments of ratification or acceptance should have represented 85% of the 
external trade of the territories included in Annex H. However, only Haiti accepted the GATT (7 March 
1952) in conformance with article XVI (Acceptance, entry in force and registration).27 Therefore, the 
GATT did not technically enter into force: under the 1947 Protocol of Provisional Application and 
subsequent Protocols of Accession, the GATT was in fact to be under provisional application for the 
following decades.28 Paraphrasing Jackson, the GATT had a ‘dubious legal status’ which has inevitably 
led to misunderstandings both by the general public and the media, and even by government officials.29 
Logically, this could have led to a variety of challenging legal issues and questions. However, interestin-
gly, the constitutional and international legal literature rarely raised this issue in detail. 
15. Provisional application did not bring into question the legal nature of this instrument,30 but 
rather the way of going about things, given that parliamentary democracies did not take much part in 
developing this critical node of global exchange until the mid-90s!! Half a century of provisional appli-
cation, without parliamentary ratifications, is a rather long process and, as such, an interesting issue for 
23  For a fine biographical sketch of this ‘towering figure’ in GATT history see, in particular, R. De Souzas Farias, ‘Mr 
GATT: Eric Wyndham White and the quest for trade liberalization’, 3 World Trade Review (2013): 463–485.
24  See J. braitHwaite/ P. draHos, Global Business Regulation, op.cit.p.177.
25  See E. Wyndham White, ‘GATT as an International Trade Organization’ (public speech), Polish Institute of International 
Affairs (Warsaw, 6 June 1961).
26  K. daM, The GATT Law and International, op.cit.p.335.
27  Liberia also accepted the GATT on 17 May 1950, but withdrew on 13 June 1953. See Analytical Index of the GATT: 
Guide to GATT law and practice, at 924.
28  See J. Jackson, ‘The Puzzle of GATT’, 1 Journal of World Trade Law 2 (1967):133, note.14 and E. Petersmann, ‘The 
Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 
1948’, 31 Common Market Law Review (1994):1162.
29  J. Jackson, ‘Designing and Implementing Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures: WTO Dispute Settlement, Appraisal 
and Prospects’, The WTO as an International Organization (University of Chicago Press 1998) at 163.
30  See article 25 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties (provisional application).
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analysis. As such, Jan Klabbers chose the GATT as the most famous example of how provisions on the 
entry into force of treaties is not the best indicator of the binding nature of such treaties.31  Nevertheless, 
this situation influenced the way that things were done within GATT during that long period. In this 
respect, for example, it is quite illustrative that the initials of the ICITO were formally displayed at the 
GATT headquarters for many years.32 Equally interesting is the fact the United States Congress authori-
zed its annual contributions to the GATT in the budgetary section of ‘international conferences and anci-
llary costs’ until 1968. Hence, during their early years, the building of the post-war legal infrastructures 
for open markets basically advanced keeping the organization’s head above water.  
16. John Jackson refers to the ‘fiction’ that the GATT was not an ‘organization’ but had generally 
avoided the adjective ‘international’, whenever he referred to it in his early legal writings. In line with 
this, the section on this matter in his classic work The World Trading System (1989) is indicatively entit-
led ‘the GATT as organization’.33 In his words, the General Agreement did not establish an organization 
‘in theory’, although ‘in practice’ operated as one34. In turn, other scholars maintain that the GATT was 
neither a treaty nor an international organization35. Similar differences of approach regarding this issue 
permeate the legal literature. In Spanish scholarship, for example, Remiro Brotons contends that it was 
understandable that, for international legal experts, the GATT was a clumsy instrument due to its evi-
dent inability to survive in defiance of the most basic legal standards and forms; f“it is understood that 
for internationalist legal doctrinaires the  GATT was a cumbersome case given its evident incapacity to 
survive despite the most basic standards and legal forms” furthermore, Brotons goes so far to state that 
the GATT lacked international subjectivity.36 For other scholars, such as Liñán Nogueras, the GATT 
operated ‘on the basis of a somewhat conventional provisionality and with an organic element that was 
far from formal constructions’.37 By contrast, Pastor Ridruejo holds that the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
of the GATT ‘empirically created’ an international organization.38 
17. The international legal literature exploring these questions offers diverse legal interpreta-
tions regarding this very issue. Certainly, the GATT was a curious experiment, both unusual and inno-
vative, which was to progressively grow in strength despite its serious ‘birth defects’. The old-school 
GATT diplomacy managed to progressively develop one of the most effective and powerful regulatory 
regimes in contemporary world history. As mentioned, the success of GATT ‘as an organization’ was 
due to the efforts of a very small community of trade diplomats who managed intelligently to sustain 
and reinforce its originally precarious set of rules against the odds of its flawed origins. In the words 
of Hudec, a ‘slow incremental development’ was the secret to the GATT’s legal success over all these 
decades.39 As a result, the GATT community ended up organizing eight MTN Rounds, until finally an 
international organization with a remarkable institutional design and fully fledged international legal 
personality came into being, when WTO burst onto the scene of global governance on 1 January 1995.40 
In short, the success of GATT’s regime-building is an unprecedented experience in the history of global 
governance. It vividly illustrates how the strong political will of a minor group of peoples -mainly com-
prising trade diplomats and officials- was able to keep the flame of open markets alive in a precarious 
and provisional context, for decades. The peculiar and tortuous path towards its institutional consolida-
tion since its weak inception after the Second World War has in fact led some literature to qualify the 
31  J. Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (Kluwer Law International 1996), pp.75–76.
32  P. NicHols, ‘GATT Doctrine’, 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 2 (1996): 390, note 57.
33  J. Jackson, The World Trading System, op.cit.p.37 and 41. 
34  J. Jackson, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations. Cases, Materials and Text (West Publishers 1995) at 289. 
35  P. NicHols, ‘GATT Doctrine’, op.cit.p.390.
36  A. Remiro Brotons, ‘Pelagattos y Aristogattos de la Comunidad Europea ante el Reino de la OMC’, 26 Gaceta Jurídica 
de la Comunidad Europea (1996):17–18.
37  D. liñán nogueras, in M. Diez de Velasco, Instituciones de Derecho Internacional Público (Tecnos 2011) at 615.
38  J. A. Pastor ridrueJo, Curso de Derecho Internacional Público y Organizaciones Internacionales (Tecnos 1996) at 823. 
39  R. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: the Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System (Butterworth Legal 
Publishers 1993) at 364.
40  R. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law, op.cit.p.364.
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GATT as an ‘historic accident’,   and these observers are not far wrong,41 as the so-called GATT club 
successfully challenged all traditional legal standards of its era. 
II. The rule-based system 
18. The development of the world trading system is a landmark in contemporary world history. In 
order to understand how this regime came about, transforming itself into WTO, it is particularly illustrati-
ve to focus on the community of professionals that ‘chipped away’ tenaciously over decades to construct 
a dispute settlement mechanism within a regime under provisional application. The first by-product of 
their collective effort was the invention of GATT panels, which with the passage of time gradually beca-
me formalized, until its final transformation into a first ever and brand new world tribunal in January 1 
1995; a mechanism that is sometimes portrayed, in its own rights, as the jewel in the crown of the WTO.
19. Law, lawyers and adjudication have played a changing role in the world trading system 
from the earliest days of its precarious inception. In this regard, one of the most interesting phenomena 
arising from the experience of regime-building in the GATT is the diverse and changing uses of law and 
adjudication within the body. In fact, the history of world trade liberalization since the end of the Se-
cond World War -and thus the origins and foundations for global economic interdependence- cannot be 
effectively grasped without paying attention to this phenomenon. In essence, the world trading system 
has passed through five main stages with regard to rule-based adjudication. Basically, these stages have 
defined and redefined half a century of global economic interdependence, first with regard to trade in 
goods (GATT 1947-1994) and finally also in terms of services (GATS 1995) as well as propertization of 
intangibles (TRIPS 1995):
•   Phase 1: a first ‘legalist’ stage, which dominated the drafting of the GATT and its amendments 
at the end of the nineteen forties (1946-1947);42 
•   Phase 2: a long ‘pragmatic’ stage (focused on consensus-building), which governs its admi-
nistration and the interpretation of legal texts over the next twenty years (1947-1970s); 
•   Phase 3: a third stage of relative inactivity regarding rule-based adjudication, which covers 
the decade of the 70s, and concluding in 1979 with the new rules resulting from the Tokyo 
Round; 
•   Phase 4: a following stage which began in the 80s when the focus returned again to law as the 
preferential technique to develop solutions for trade disputes. 
•  Phase 5: a current fifth stage characterized by fully-fledged hyper-legalization.
20. In the beginning, the evolution of GATT starts out with a markedly diplomatic approach. 
Initially, the first delegations considered that diplomacy (not law) should be the main tool for resol-
ving inter-state differences in GATT. The collective attitude was best summarized by John Jackson, as 
leaving ‘legal technicalities’ to one side.43 By that time, the legal approach was viewed with criticism 
and even certain mistrust. The reason is simple: as explained, the GATT of 1947 was basically a tariff-
liberalization agreement lacking appropriate institutional structures. Since the ITO Charter failed to 
pass through the US Congress, the agreement was under provisional application and, in consequence, 
in a precarious situation for playing the hard-law game. Therefore, the Contracting Parties administered 
the GATT under consensus, and stayed focused on consensus-building for a long period, as a means of 
surviving while awaiting better days: at that time, consensus-building was the name of the game, built 
around a loose but intelligently administered article XXV.
41  T. Flory, Le GATT. Droit International, op.cit.pp.4-5 and G. Curzon & V. Curzon, ‘“GATT: Traders´ Club, op.cit. p.31.
42  K. Dam, The GATT Law, op.cit.p.4.
43  J. Jackson, ‘The Puzzle of GATT’, 1 Journal of World Trade Law 2 (1967): 132.
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21. In this way, during the first few decades of the GATT, an eminently diplomatic approach go-
verned the administration of GATT rules. As Robert Hudec portrayed it, the GATT of this period operated 
as a diplomatic instrument.44 In the words of the last Director General of the GATT of 47, Olivier Long 
(1968-1980), emphasizing the importance of the diplomatic approach at that time: ‘legalism does not 
contribute to trade liberalization’. For this former Director General, the primary objective of the dispute 
settlement procedures was not to decide who is right and who is wrong but to proceed in such a way that 
even significant violations ‘are only temporary and are terminated as quickly as possible’.45 This policy 
vision, however, slowly lost support as the GATT became more firmly entrenched as an organization. 
22. Thus, the strong consensus-building culture in the GATT´s epistemic community developed, 
expanded and reinforced the bits and pieces of an originally weak instrument (under purely provisional 
application) to incrementally construct one of the most highly effective nodal regimes of global econo-
mic governance. Only after the trade diplomats managed to deliver six consecutive tariff Rounds, the 
GATT regime was basically consolidated, and a more legalist approach (based on state rights and obli-
gations) gradually begun gaining credence. As a result, legal compliance slowly moved centre stage, as 
the preferred approach to trade disputes. 
23. Literally, diplomacy died by success. By regularly lowering tariffs, the consensus-based 
former GATT was ready to jump to a compliance-based hard-law regime. However, the triumph of law 
over diplomacy was not achieved without strong policy tensions. The debate over the relative weight 
of legal rules vis-à-vis diplomacy within the world trading system not only would involve discussions 
on the most effective methods and techniques to solve trade disputes but also, and inevitably, cultural 
clashes with regard to the best professional qualifications to participate in the new policy era. 
24. The debate over balancing diplomacy and law inside GATT decision-making, as Jackson re-
calls, has a long history.46 However, it was during the nineteen eighties that these two main philosophies 
-diplomacy and law- came into conflict, both in respect of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism (pa-
nels) and, by logical extension, with respect to the inner functioning and development of the world trading 
system.47 The competing perceptions with regard to the direction of the mechanics of dispute settlement 
(and GATT as a functional regime itself) were often encapsuled in a basic and clear-cut dichotomy: (1) 
legalism vs pragmatism or, in other words, (2) rule-based approaches vs diplomatic approaches. 
25. Recalling that period, for example, William Davey, the first Director of the WTO legal ser-
vice (1995-1999) attributed  greater emphasis on negotiation and consensus as opposed to the ‘anti-le-
galist’ approach, and an accentuation of adjudication (dispute settlement by third parties) to the ‘legalist’ 
approach.48 This policy battle had a critical importance for the world trading system from a functional 
perspective. However, as mentioned, the battle was not only over defining the preferential techniques for 
administering the evolution of the GATT but also inevitably over the professional qualifications of those 
individuals best suited to do the job. Ultimately, legalism and the increasing influence of both the legal 
profession and trade law scholars would shift the power-relations inside the GATT community towards 
the so-called ‘rule-based approach’.49 
26. The inauguration of the Journal of World Trade Law in 1967 was also a meaningful sign of 
the times, by mainstreaming world trade law into academia. But more significantly, it is no coincidence 
44  R. Hudec, ‘The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence’, 4 Journal of World Trade (1970): 615.
45  O. Long, Law and Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral System (Martinus Nijhoff 1987) at 71 and 73. 
46  See J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization, op.cit.p.63.
47  See ‘Review of the Effectiveness of Trade Dispute Settlement under The GATT and the Tokyo Round Agreements’, 
Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, on Investigation Nº332-212 Under Section 332 (g) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 
USITC Publication 1793 (December 1985) at 68. 
48  W. DaVey, ‘Dispute Settlement in GATT’, 11 Fordham International Law Journal 1 (1987): 66 and 97.
49  See R. SHell, ‘Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization’, 44 
Duke Law Journal 5 (1995): 846 and note 81.
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that one of the leading intellectual figures behind the idea of creating a brand new rule-based interna-
tional organization at the Uruguay Round, John Jackson, also distinguished between a ‘diplomatic ap-
proach’ and ‘rule-based approach’ in GATT.50 In fact, this academic authored the first legal monograph 
on GATT, as early as 1969.51 It goes without saying that what he coined as ‘rule-based approach’ meant 
a primary role for law in practice, with a few subtle pragmatic considerations. As Jackson explains, the 
tension was therefore a question of degree, of preponderance of one element over another, more than an 
extreme confrontation in the sense of a zero-sum game.52
27. In the earlier stages of the GATT, even the legal nature of its rules was questioned. Hudec’s 
comments regarding the characterization of the GATT rules in 1978,53 as well as those on the GATT 
legal system a few years before (1970), are particularly apposite reflections on this theme: 
‘The key to understanding the GATT legal system is to recognize that GATT’s law has been de-
signed and operated as an instrument of diplomacy. Although the GATT legal system has many points 
in common with domestic models, the thing which sets it apart from others is the overriding concern for 
‘flexibility’ –the insistence that the law’s coercive pressures be applied in a controlled fashion which 
allow room for maneuver at every stage of the process.54 
28. In short, the rule-based approach was a critical development in modern history of economic 
interdependence. Interestingly, some observers also attributed the diplomatic and rule-based approach to 
the behavior of some key GATT Contracting Parties. Thus, the US-originated literature tended to define 
the general attitude of the United States as ‘a legalist approach’ and that of Japan and the European Com-
munity as a diplomatic one.55 Similarly, a report on the dispute settlement mechanism drawn up by the 
US Senate in 1985 identified the United States, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Australia as Contracting 
Parties which perceive GATT as a set of binding obligations; conversely, Japan and the European Com-
munity were characterized as favoring a ‘flexible approach’, based on negotiation and consensus: “For 
the European Communities the GATT philosophy has been diplomacy rather than adjudication, and so it 
was not perceived that adjudication by third parties required a change in policies”. Therefore from this 
‘to the [European Communities], diplomacy rather than adjudication is argued to be the intended GATT 
philosophy, and third-party adjudication was not conceived of as requiring policy changes’. From that 
perspective, as the report added, the nature of GATT as an instrument regulating rights and obligations 
would be de-emphasized.56.
29. Also the more legalist approach attributed to the United States in that period was occasio-
nally associated with an alleged traditional higher reliance of Americans on law and litigation. In line 
with this thesis, greater adhesion of the US administration to legal tools in the GATT would be more a 
cultural issue than a question of interests.57 However, this approach was arguably more influenced by 
the fact that the GATT was drafted under the indisputable leadership of the United States following the 
Second World War; and thus was also better adapted to its basic policy vision and economic interests. 
Reasonably, the more legalist approach of the European Union in WTO today could be explained by the 
same token: following the Uruguay Round, the rules of the game better reflect its aggregate interests; as 
a result, legalism also makes greater sense for Europeans. 
50  See J. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System (Council on Foreign Relations Press 1990).<0}
51  See J. Jackson, World Trade, op.cit.p.43. 
52  J. Jackson, Restructuring, op.cit.p.59.
53  R. Hudec, ‘Adjudication of International Trade Disputes’, Thames Essay nº1 (Trade Policy Research Centre 1978) at 
31-33. 
54  R. Hudec. ‘The GATT legal system, op.cit.p.665.
55  See for example, inter alia, W. Davey ‘The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview, Handbook of WTO/GATT 
Dispute Settlement (Kluwer law international  1997) at 75. 
56  See Review of, op.cit.p.68.
57  R. ostriHansky, ‘Settlement of Interstate Trade Disputes: The Role of Law and Legal Procedures”, Netherlands Year-
book of International Law (1991): 180.
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30. Last but not least, legalism is naturally connected to general perceptions among world trade 
experts and practitioners with regard to the aggregate benefits resulting from participating in an open 
trading system. The greater or lesser legalist behaviour of trading nations with regard to the WTO can 
be probably best explained as such. At the present time, the rule-based approach is the overarching pat-
tern that defines the functioning of the WTO in most of its disciplines, excepting those regarding PTAs. 
Therefore, looking back, ‘legalism’ has not produced a ‘poisoning of the atmosphere’ of the multilateral 
trading system but quite the contrary; it has also strengthened it for a long time.58 Currently, the vast 
majority of the world trade community defends the benefits of a strong WTO legal system and a rule-
based approach in settling disputes59. The almost 70 years of the world trading system have ended up by 
persuading the many critics that such an approach is the most effective one for all. As Hudec recalled, 
social institutions tend to follow a pattern of maturing from informal processes involving accommoda-
ting interests, to formal processes based on pre-established norms. This is clearly the case of the rules 
within the GATT/WTO regime. In essence, the key to success in the long term was considered to be the 
progressive circumventing of power politics by promoting increased compliance with the rules of the 
game. Under that approach, however, multilateral negotiations of new rules have become increasingly 
complex. Evidently, a binding dispute settlement mechanism with teeth to authorize the suspension of 
trade concessions not only operates as a powerful lever for obtaining compliance with pre-existing com-
mitments but also raises the stakes for negotiating new law.
III. Inventing adjudication 
31. Historically, the use of dispute settlement mechanisms in free trade agreements was not 
seriously considered until the ITO was drafted,60 although the establishment of a world trade tribunal is 
obviously an older idea. In fact, Huston Thompson −a US prominent government official under Woo-
drow Wilson’s policy orbit− already suggested in 1919 the creation of an international trade tribunal to 
be incorporated into the Versailles Treaty, and advocated its development for several years.61 Aside from 
the proposals of visionary individuals, the first serious diplomatic moves in this policy direction were 
the ITO negotiations. Originally, it was agreed that the Charter rules would be justiciable in the United 
Nations International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, the idea of adjudication that prevailed at that 
time among some key trade delegates was at odds with such a development. Notwithstanding the final 
wording of the Chapter, a memorandum on the issue of the ICJ sent by the UK Delegation after the first 
drafting session of the Charter (London, 1946), captures the idea about law within some key delegations: 
‘The making of rulings under the Charter should […], we feel, be the function of the International 
Trade Organization itself and not of an outside body such as the International Court whose proper function 
is to determine questions of law and not to appraise economic facts… In almost every conceivable case 
arising under the Charter, the issues will of their nature involve the element of economic appraisal and 
assessment and will not be purely legal in character, and it will be impossible to say where economic 
judgment ends and legal argument begins’.62
32. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue that the GATT regime could not have achieved its 
long term success if a series of innovations from its earliest years had not made it possible to effectively 
settle disputes between its Contracting Parties. The failed Havana Charter contained a detailed dispute 
58  W. DaVey, ‘Dispute Settlement in GATT, op.cit.pp.70-72.
59  See for example, M. Young, ‘Dispute Settlement in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats’, 29 The 
International Lawyer 2 (1995): 389-409.
60  R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the GATT Secretariat’, op.cit.p.102. 
61  See eg. H. Thompson, ‘Reconstruction of International Good Will’, 102 Annals of the American Academy of Policy and 
Society 162 (1922), ‘World Held in Need of Trade Tribunal’, Washington Post, (June 11, 1931) at 5 and H. Thompson, ‘An 
international trade tribunal’, 34 ASIL Proceedings 1(1940): 3-4.
62  See E/PC/T/C6/W77 (14 February 1947).
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settlement procedure in articles 93, 94 and 95 (Chapter IV).63 However, acknowledging the uncertain-
ties of the ratification process explained above, the provisions from Chapter IV were reworded in the 
interim, giving rise to articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT. These two articles provide the legal basis 
for the progressive construction of a dispute settlement mechanism within the GATT regime. From the 
very early days, and on the basis of these scant provisions, the GATT diplomats set in motion a series of 
informal dispute settlement practices which were progressively developed during the first two decades, 
and finally were codified during the 1973-1979 Tokyo Round.64 Later on, those codified practices were 
to become the building blocks for designing the effective and innovative WTO dispute settlement me-
chanism at the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round.65.
Certainly, the transformation of those minimum provisions into the current WTO dispute settle-
ment mechanism is, paraphrasing Pescatore, ‘one of the most remarkable and pragmatic achievements 
of international law’.66 
33. And again, this institutional development was the direct result of joint efforts and experimen-
tation by a small group of GATT insiders. These trade representatives, officials and experts provided the 
impetus for such a complex endeavor by sharing a global policy vision regarding world trade (as public 
good). Understandably, for these people, dispute settlement was a prominent item on the agenda from the 
first meetings of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The GATT community was fully aware that regime-
building required settling disputes within the regime in one way or another, and thus some sort of dispute 
settlement mechanism had to be developed, even if such a device was to be a highly simplified one, at first. 
34. As a result, the early years of GATT show a low profile and cautious experimentation by 
some contracting parties and the Secretariat, having embarked on a sustained strategy to develop a dis-
pute settlement mechanism almost from scratch. A series of effective policy moves in the early years, 
which bear their stamp −and particularly that of Eric Wydham’s Secretariat− became key institutional 
developments in pursuing this objective. As Hudec explains, the people who negotiated the ITO were 
not prepared to abandon their original legal design easily.67 The original participants saw themselves as 
keepers of a flame,68 and managed to progressively develop their own way of doing things. 
35. As explained, a global epistemic regime had born during the Havana negotiations. The in-
vention of the so-called GATT panels is a significantly defining example, as these are in fact one of the 
most recognizable institutional features of GATT.69 The origin of the idea took shape during the early 
meetings of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. From then on, they gradually became the vehicle to settle 
disputes within the GATT. In particular, the process began in the first period of sessions in Geneva, 
when Cuba and the Benelux requested a qualified opinion from the Chairman of the meeting of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES regarding a dispute on discriminatory taxes.70 Following some consulta-
tions, the Chairman proposed a decision, which was adopted without opposition from any of the GATT 
contracting parties: ‘the meeting agreed...’;71 Cuba subsequently withdrew the measure which had led to 
the dispute. However, the formula of a single adjudicator would be subsequently abandoned, probably 
foreseeing the complexity of future claims and the concentration of power that such formula could gene-
63  For a comment see W. Brown, The United States and the Restoration of World Trade: An Analysis and Appraisal of ITO 
Charter and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Brookings Institution 1950), pp.227 and subsequent pages.
64  A. Ligustro, Le controversie tra stati nel diritto del commercio internazionale: del GATT all’OMC (Cedam 1996) at 94.
65  On the model and preliminary proposals for reform of the mechanism see, in particular, R. Hudec, Adjudication of In-
ternational Trade Disputes, Thames Essay nº16 (Trade Policy Research Centre 1978) and W. Davey, ‘Dispute Settlement in 
GATT’, 11 Fordham International Law Journal 1 (1987): 51-106.
66  P. Pescatore, ‘Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement’, Handbook of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement, 
op.cit.p.7.
67  R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the GATT Secretariat’, op.cit.p.103.
68  A. cHayes/ A. Handler cHayes, The new sovereignty, op.cit. p.279.  
69  O. Long, Law and Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral System (Martinus Nijhoff 1985), p.77.
70  See GATT/CP.2/9 (19 July 1948), Appendix A, Item 1.
71  See GATT/CP.2/SR.11 (24 August 1948), p.8.
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rate. Thus, there was only one other case on Indian taxes on products with export rebates, between India 
and Pakistan, which would be later settled bilaterally,72 as India made reservations to the Chairman´s 
ruling in that second session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.73 In this way, working groups began to 
be used after that session. These working groups would be focused on seeking a ‘practical solution’.74 
36. Interestingly, embedded in these original practices, conciliation is highly visible throughout 
the progressive development of the GATT dispute settlement system. The main feature of these ad hoc 
bodies, composed by representatives of contracting parties, was that the conflicting parties within the 
working group were also involved in the diplomatic process of finding practical solutions. However, 
this formula was also soon to reveal its limitations. In this regard, the working group hearing a dispute 
between France and Brazil on discriminatory internal taxes on imported products, in the second Session, 
was to remain on the GATT agenda from April 1949 to November 1957.75 Thus, as the difficulties of a 
strictly conciliatory model became clear, working groups would soon evolve to more adjudicative forms 
and mechanics. This institutional development came about with the Australian Subsidy on Ammonium 
Sulphate case:76 in this case, five state representatives discussed the issues at stake within the working 
group; however, this time only third parties made the final decision (United States, Norway and the 
United Kingdom).77  This critical development was the turning point for the progressive deploying of a 
dispute settlement infrastructure within the GATT. As Hudec suggests, the change was so significant that 
it can only be explained as part of a deliberate plan.78 
37. From then on, it would be necessary to wait for the seventh GATT session (1952) to see 
how this transformation evolved. As the agenda for that session formally included 12 pending cases, the 
President, the Norwegian Johan Melander, proposed setting up a single working group to resolve them 
all. The list of possible members for that working group, finally proposed to the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES by the Secretariat, inaugurated the now traditional ‘shortlist’ of so-called ‘GATT panelists’. It was 
at that time that the term ‘panel’ was first formally used by Melander himself to define the new formula; 
moreover, there were no representatives of major trading powers among the chosen panel members. 
The emphasis was placed on the technical expertise of those involved with dispute settlement, and thus 
on reducing power-politics within the procedures. Also the disputing parties did not object to the final 
proposal delivered by the panel, lending support to the argument that the parties had been consulted 
beforehand to facilitate dispute settlement regime-building: as Robert Hudec explains, the first step was 
to propose a single working group; and a few days later, the term ‘panel’ was slipped in without actually 
explaining what form it would take. The structure was the same as previous working groups; however, 
it was agreed that disputing parties would not be allowed to vote, and they were also not permitted to be 
present when the decision was discussed and finally adopted.79 The panel’s mandate, becoming a short 
of template for later cases, reads as follows: 
‘To consider, in consultation with the representatives of the countries directly concerned and of 
other interested countries, complaints referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXIII and 
such other complaints as the CONTRACTING PARTIES may expressly refer to the Panel and to submit 
findings and recommendations to the CONTRACTING PARTIES’.80 
72  GATT/CP.3/6 (21 February 1948), p.2.
73  See GATT/CP.2/9 (19 July 1948), Appendix A, Item 2. 
74  See GATT/CP.4/SR.21 (3 April 1950), p.8.
75  On this interesting case see, in particular, R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System, op.cit.p.110-120.
76  See GATT/CP.4/39, Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate (31 March 1950). 
77  The Report, drafted by the Secretariat, was adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 3 April 1950 and is accompa-
nied by an appendix or memorandum from Australia stating its disagreement.
78  R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System, op.cit.p.70.
79  R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the GATT Secretariat’, op.cit.p.108.
80  See SR7/7 (14  October 1952) and R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System, op.cit.p.75.
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38. Rosine Plank provides a detail that highlights the phenomenon: ‘the panel procedure was an 
invention-almost a conspiracy-devised by the secretariat to loosen the hold of the bigger powers which 
dominated the working parties at that time, and to re-enforce the secretariat's role in guiding and drafting 
rulings or recommendations to be submitted to the plenary session’.81 The Executive Secretary declared 
in a note written in 1955 that ‘the primary function of the panel is to prepare an objective analysis for 
consideration by the contracting parties, in which the special interests of individual governments are 
subordinated to the basic objective of applying the Agreement impartially and for the benefit of the 
contracting parties in general’.82 
39. The organizational mechanics were relatively simple: the disputing parties explained their 
arguments to the panel, providing information and documentation in support of their claim; on occa-
sion, this was complemented with information that other interested parties deemed it appropriate to 
submit. In the following step, the panel drew up a draft report behind closed doors and, as mentioned, 
excluding the disputing parties. The disputing parties were then given the opportunity to discuss the 
draft report with panel members, a practice still present in WTO dispute settlement procedures. From 
then on, the final report was drafted taking into account their positions, and adopted by consensus; thus 
excluding dissenting opinions. Following this, the report was issued to the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
for final decision (read approval or dismissal). The GATT Secretariat under the leadership of Wynham 
White increased its role within these new practices, by drafting documents, organizing meetings, and 
providing information and documentation to the panel members. Also, according to Robert Hudec’s 
interviews with participants, it was the Secretariat which drew up most of the reports in this first stage 
of the GATT.83 From then on, dispute settlement procedures would be subject to gradual formalization, 
taking shape as a hybrid adjudicative form in no-man’s land from the perspective of comparative in-
ternational law. 
40. Regime-building required subtle experimentation. In this regard, the use of panels also in-
volved the spatial rearrangement of the room where the differences were addressed. Thus, a strategic 
and gradual transformation from the debating round table to the ‘courtroom’ took place, with the panel 
members and the disputing parties ending seated at separate tables. With this innovation, formal yet 
imbued with symbolism, the appearance and flavor of judicial practice was incorporated at no political 
cost. Taking into consideration the traditional difficulties of formally pursuing the creation of any inter-
national tribunal, a subtle move of this kind was remarkable; again, as mentioned above, the GATT was 
under provisional application, and lacked any formal treaty-based organ aside from Article XV (Joint 
action by the contracting parties). 
41. The contracting parties soon began recognizing the auctoritas of the GATT panels. The four 
reports submitted in the seventh session, for example, required no debate prior to their approval. At this 
stage, the panelists began to be formally appointed in their role as trade law experts. By taking such step, 
dispute settlement activities were consensually framed as a professional activity, and thus would soon 
nurture its own culture and procedures. Dispute settlement was slowly beginning to be drawn towards 
professional practice, as a means not only of increasing technical refinement but also institutional legi-
timacy. In fact, when making an assessment of how GATT was operating in the ninth session, several 
delegates formally voiced their positive opinions in respect of the way the panels were working: the Da-
nish delegate even formally proposed using the panel technique in other areas which had been the pro-
vince of working groups until that time (ie: import restrictions for balance of payments difficulties); and, 
81  R. Plank, ‘An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and Does Not’, 4 Journal of International Arbitration 
4 (1987): 55 (emphasis added). 
82  R. Plank, ‘An Unofficial Description, op.cit. 
83  See R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the Secretariat’, op.cit. p.107, R.Hudec, The GATT Legal System, op.cit.p.78 and R. Plank, 
‘An Unofficial Description’, op.cit. pp.74-77.
Level up: a history of regime-building at Gatt ClubPablo ZaPatero Miguel
831Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Octubre 2020), Vol. 12, Nº 2, pp. 818-839
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt - DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2020.5632
in fact, in the next session the Secretariat submitted a report proposing the experimental use of the panel 
technique in such areas.84 Nevertheless, the delegations finally agreed to leave things as they were.85
42. This first decade of the GATT regime was a period in which trade diplomats -many of whom 
were seasoned veterans-  governed the day to day operation of the organization in the group spirit arising 
from the ITO negotiations. The GATT’s rather precarious status led them to emphasize a diplomatic 
approach to dispute settlement. Thus, diplomatic skills were highly appreciated by many GATT prac-
titioners. However, the triumph of the diplomatic approach within the panels during this period would 
inevitably make their reports rife with ambiguities and generalities. In Hudec’s rationalization of this 
period, given the uncertain perception that awaited the GATT legal obligations in the capitals, it was im-
portant not to undermine all the prestige that GATT had gained with decisions that governments might 
well not be capable of fulfilling. Thus, as this fine scholar explains, the first GATT decisions were gene-
rally adjusted to this need for pleasant, smooth and more obscure legal decisions, using the language of 
diplomacy rather than legal jargon: in his words, the skills laid in suggesting the requisite conclusions 
by using impressionist brushstrokes which, when closely examined ‘never actually stated on paper their 
real meaning, despite everyone being fully aware of their significance’. By using this technique, it was 
impossible to reach a satisfactory legal conclusion (at least using normal standards of legal analysis) as 
to what the decisions really mean or what they actually required.86 This stage is often characterized by 
referring to the indecipherable nature of the reports. 
43. Certainly, the impressionist practices of that era raised serious criticism.87 However, it should 
also be emphasized that this approach was in all probability the only option open to GATT dispute settle-
ment at that time, given the context in which it found itself in the nineteen fifties, hampered as it was not 
only by its precarious status but its institutional weaknesses. In this respect, the strategy of GATT diplo-
mats was completely rational, and probably the only means available at the time for keeping the regime 
on track. In short, at that time, the cryptic, almost artistic nature of those first reports fulfilled a pertinent 
function at the time, namely, to resolve inter-state disputes sotto voce. This pragmatic strategy helped 
to preserve the unstable institutional structure of the GATT regime from major political tensions, while 
awaiting better times ahead. Thus, a cooperative and conciliatory atmosphere was at the fore during this 
period. Curzon depicted this atmosphere by framing the GATT as a club. The discussions within four 
walls, the attempts at conciliation rather than head-on conflicts, the private meetings ‘to talk things over’ 
were all features of this club-like atmosphere; indeed, the GATT club.88 
IV. The “legal barbarians” 
44. The club-like atmosphere would have a critical significance for regime-building within 
GATT, both in the short and long term, as it allowed the incumbents not only to construct common un-
derstandings on key issues but also to get comfortably involved in a controlled experimentation which 
would lay the foundations within the regime for an increased formal use of law, legal procedures and 
lawyers, with the passing of time. Hudec frames this first period in similar lines by stating that the GATT 
had to get along with ‘whatever low-visibility procedures could be developed consistently with the pre-
tence of not being an organization’: ‘the GATT would be a ‘club’, a place where like-minded officials 
84  See GATT L/392/Rev.1, Considerations concerning the Extended Use of Panels (6 October 1955).
85  R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System, op.cit.p.81.
86  R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the Secretariat’, op.cit.p.106.
87  See Review of the Effectiveness of Trade Dispute Settlement under the GATT and the Tokyo Round Agreements. Report 
to the Committe on Finance, U.S. Senate, On Investigation Nº332-212 Under Section 332 (g) of the Tariff Act of 1930, USITC 
Publication 1793 (December 1985) at 78.
88  G. CurZon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy: The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade and Its Impact on Nation-
al Commercial Policies and Techniques (Michael Joseph Books 1965) at 52-53.
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could communicate without having to spell things out in confrontation-producing clarity’.89 In other 
words, as Weiler explains, the GATT operatives became a classical network: 
‘A very dominant feature of the GATT was its self-referential and even communitarian ethos ex-
plicable in constructivist terms. The GATT successfully managed a relative insulation from the "outside" 
world of international relations and established among its practitioners a closely knit environment revol-
ving round a certain set of shared normative values (of free trade) and shared institutional (and personal) 
ambitions situated in a matrix of long-term first-name contacts and friendly personal relationships’90 
45. Within this context, the dispute settlement mechanism managed to solve more than twenty 
disputes, functioning regularly until 1963. From then on, however, the panels system fell into disuse 
from 1964 to 1970. One of the basic reasons was the entry on the scene of the European Economic 
Community’s (EEC) in 1958; and particularly its Common Agricultural Policy and preferential trade 
relations with overseas territories. These policies led EEC members to play the flexibility card within 
the GATT. Added to this were the trade claims from developing countries, recently incorporated in 
the GATT, who were demanding more effective access for their exports to the markets of developed 
countries.91  Thus, paraphrasing Ernst-Ullrich Petersmann, the decade of the 60s was characterized by 
the pragmatic attempt to accommodate the GATT ‘without undue legalism’ to the project of European 
integration and the new majority of developing countries in the world trading system.92 
 46. Given this state of affairs, the activity of panels was brought to a halt. However, this situa-
tion soon changed, as the increase in non-tariff barriers, which affected the consolidated tariff conces-
sions within GATT, led the US administration to put heavy pressure on its trading partners to open a 
seventh MTN Round in 1973. The Tokyo Round (1973-1979) intended to address these policy tensions 
as well as improve some procedural issues in GATT dispute settlement, among other matters. During the 
Round, the EEC opposed any reform to the dispute settlement mechanism but agreed to its customary 
practices being codified. As a result, the negotiating parties adopted the so-called 1979 Understanding 
−consisting of 25 articles in 4 sections regulating notifications, consultations, dispute settlement and the 
monitoring of compliance− in an Annex under the title ‘Agreed Description of the Customary Practice 
of the GATT’.93 Interestingly, the provisions of the Understanding were also complemented by multiple 
special provisions on dispute settlement contained in diverse Tokyo Round Codes, which overshadowed 
the new rules by fragmenting adjudicative procedures and authorities.94 In any case, the 1979 Unders-
tanding facilitated the return of activity to the panels system. 
47. However, making GATT panels once again a core mechanism of the world trading system 
would also facilitate a turning point in the GATT regime, as the decade of the 70s veered in the direc-
tion of increasingly litigious and legalist attitudes, and thus a significant structural change in cultural 
and institutional terms. There were two basic motives underlying this change of direction. The first of 
these was a generational takeover of the delegations. As mentioned above, the original delegations had 
a strong diplomatic focus, given the provisional application of GATT and its original lack of any ins-
titutional structures. However, the new generations of delegates had inherited a relatively established 
‘organization’ and therefore their sensibilities were different to those of the old school trade diplomats, 
89  R. Hudec. ‘The GATT legal system, op.cit.p.635.
90  J.weiler, ‘The rule of law and the ethos of diplomats’, Efficiency, equity and legitimacy: the multilateral trading system 
at the Millenium (Brookin Institution Press 2001): 334–336.
91  R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the Secretariat’, op.cit.pp.108-109.
92  E. PetersMann, The GATT/WTO, op.cit.p.84.
93  See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, BISD S26/210 (1980). 
94  See Ministerial Declaration 1982, Doc BISD S29/9-23 (1983), Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES Doc BISD 
31S/9-10 (1985) Decision of the GATT Council 1988, Doc BISD S35/382 (1989) and Decision of the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES 1989, Doc BISD 36/66 and subsequent pages (1989).
Level up: a history of regime-building at Gatt ClubPablo ZaPatero Miguel
833Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Octubre 2020), Vol. 12, Nº 2, pp. 818-839
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt - DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2020.5632
particularly in terms of the relative emphasis given to the roles of diplomacy and litigation in the world 
trading system. In their eyes, rules (read law) should prevail in GATT dispute settlement.
48. The second motive was the entry on the scene of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR): a brand new specialized trade agency in the United States, which assumed the trade policy 
functions formerly attributed to the Department of State. This new administrative body, from its crea-
tion, operated an openly litigious policy within the GATT, and thus developed extremely technical 
legal arguments, using teams of lawyers for this purpose. Inevitably, the aggressive new policy of 
the USTR −in which claims were loaded with drawn out baroque style legal arguments and esoteric 
legal claims−95  forced the panels to redirect the way in which they approached cases.  Attitudes and 
expectations changed, and the panels felt pushed to amend their well established lex artis diplomatica. 
At the same time, the change forced all counterparts who were in dispute with the USTR to employ 
similar techniques.96 
49. The days of traditional GATT diplomacy were numbered and the legalist approach gradually 
began to gain credence. Thus, a phase was coming to an end.  However, inevitably, the GATT regime 
was not adapted to the emerging culture; in fact, there were few experts familiar with the technicalities 
required by this new approach to disputes not only among the state delegates who normally made up the 
panels, but in the GATT Secretariat as well. In this context, the pressure on the panels system for further 
technical legal refinement ended by precipitating a crisis. In essence, the system was unable to withstand 
the contradicting pressures: the panel members endeavored to reconcile the old and new cultures without 
success, seeking impossible balances between diplomacy and legalism to keep both sides happy.
50. The basic feature of the most contentious cases of this period was the questioning of the 
technical legal quality of reports as well as decision-making procedures within the procedures of the 
panels. Under the new rules of the 1979 Understanding, disputing parties and the most legally-oriented 
delegations, in general, tended to play hard against the supposed ‘low legal standards’ of some reports as 
well as other procedural decisions of GATT panels. In this context, some controversial cases exacerba-
ted the tensions between the US and European countries, such as the so-called DISC cases on corporate 
tax practices and export subsidies.97  In essence, a new culture arose in the GATT with force and momen-
tum. At this stage of regime-building, a new legal culture, winning positions within the GATT claimed 
that disputes could be best resolved using technical criteria, namely world trade law. The policy vision 
behind such positioning was constructing an ‘expert legal system’ within the GATT regime;98 in other 
words, building a specialized system of international law.99 
51. In the early days of this new phase, John Jackson published World Trade and the Law of 
GATT (1969) with the indicative subtitle ‘A legal Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade’.100 The policy vision contained in this work –informally referred to by many as the GATT ‘bi-
ble’–sent a strong message across the board for perfecting legal techniques within the world trading 
95  R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System, op.cit.pp.112-113. 
96  For a detailed account and insights on the impact of this US agency in framing the evolution of world trade law and pol-
icy since its inception see, in particular, S. Dryden, Trade Warriors: USTR and the American Crusade for Free Trade (Oxford 
University Press 1995).
97  See United States Tax Legislation (DISC), Report of the Panel presented to the Council of Representatives on 12 Nov-
ember 1976, BISD S23/98 (1977); Income Tax Practices Maintained by Belgium, BISD S23/127 (1977); Income Tax Practices 
Maintained by France, BISD S23/114 (1977); and Income Tax Practices Maintained by the Netherlands, BISD S23/114 (1977).
98  For a fine reflection on the need to construct GATT as a ‘legal system’ (taking the DISC cases as case study) see J. Jack-
son, ‘The jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT’, 72 American Journal of International Law (1978): 
747–781.
99  See P. ZaPatero, ‘Modern international law, op.cit.
100  See J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT. A Legal Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(The Boobs-Merrills Company Inc 1969).
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system in order to upgrade its institutional efficiencies.101 56. The stance taken by this fine academic was 
highly visible and influential in GATT circles, helping to legitimize policy change towards the so-called 
‘rule-based approach’. As David Kennedy recalls, ‘it was Jackson who largely invented the field [of 
trade law], transforming his experiences with the United Trade Representative’s office from a narrowing 
regulatory specialty into a recognized subject of legal study’.102 The policy vision coined within that 
monograph as the ‘rule-based approach’ was to later expand into multiple influential academic articles, 
and it was finally to become mainstreamed in GATT lingua two decades later with the help of The World 
Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (1989),103 published right in the 
middle of the Uruguay Round Negotiations (1986-1994).
52. The emerging new culture of the world trading system required different expertise and tech-
nologies. The GATT was changing, and not only from within the delegations but from within the Secre-
tariat itself. Thus, when the Swiss Arthur Dunkel (1980-1993) succeeded Olivier Long (1968-1980) as 
Director of the GATT Secretariat, a final blow was dealt to the embattled old and new cultures. Indeed, 
Olivier Long was the last great proponent of the diplomatic approach within the Secretariat. In fact, it 
was he who proposed the idea of legally-controlled pragmatism in his Law and its Limitations in the 
GATT Multilateral Trade System (1985): according to the former Director General, ‘the General Agree-
ment offers many possibilities for a legally controlled pragmatism, and throughout the history of GATT, 
contracting parties have responded constructively and positively to international economic and political 
conditions, without having undue regard to legal technicalities’.104 However, a new era had begun. The 
diplomatic approach  −which was the direct legacy of those who had negotiated the Havana Charter and 
kept the GATT afloat during its early years− was now also withdrawing from the Secretariat. In fact, 
Dunkel was to promote, not without some hardship, the creation of a legal service within the Secretariat 
itself; the new Director General’s aim was to guarantee against any ‘legal errors’ made by the panels, by 
assisting them in improving quality and technical accuracy of their decisions.105 
53. The increase in the legal quality of the panel reports in the eighties was definitely attribu-
table to this initiative. From then on, the GATT had fairly well structured procedures in place (the 79 
Understanding and other Tokyo Codes) and a growing number of delegates and experts were in favor 
of upgrading the position of legal rules in dispute settlement activities. Therefore, in order to close the 
circle of rule-based adjudication, the last big pitfall to avoid was the so-called ‘positive consensus’: 
the  requirement for panels to be established as well as panel reports to be adopted by consensus at the 
GATT General Council. As a result, any contracting party could block the establishment of a panel or the 
adoption of a given report. Thus, the functioning of panels could be easily obstructed. For decades, the 
‘positive consensus’ was entrenched in both culture and practices of the old trade diplomats, as a rational 
way of securing the survival of an originally weak GATT under provisional application.106. However, 
new militancies and interests achieved reforms that hitherto would have been unthinkable. In essence, 
the GATT Contracting Parties were fully aware of the benefits to be gained by generally honoring the 
rules of the game contained in world trade law. At the same time, the growing auctoritas of panels −as 
a result of their increased legal expertise− helped to pursue a stronger rule-based policy approach which 
would close the circle of world trade law. 
101  For his current approach to world trade law after the inception of WTO see J. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT 
and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations (Cambridge University Press 2000) as well as, in particular, 
J. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and the Changing fundamentals of international law (Cambridge University Press 2006).
102  See D.kennedy, ‘The international style in postwar law and policy: John Jackson and the field of international economic 
law’, 2 American Journal of International Law and Policy 10 (1995): 672.
103  J. Jackson, World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (The MIT Press 1989).
104  O. long, Law and its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System (Martinus Nijhoff 1985) at 35 –36 and 62. 
105  R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the Secretariat’ op.cit. pp.114–115.
106  See Review of the Effectiveness, op.cit.p.79.
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54. These developments, together with the pressure of US trade unilateralism,107 led the GATT 
Contracting Parties to finally eliminate the ‘positive consensus’ rule from the provisions of the new 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding under negotiation during the Uruguay Round. Paradoxically, 
in this regard, such change towards automatic and fully binding legal adjudication within the world 
trading system came about partly as a result of trade unilateralism..  During the Uruguay Round, the 
USTR managed to obtain a mandate from the US Congress to combat outside GATT procedures the 
supposed ‘unfair’ practices of other contracting parties. From its earliest days, the world trading system 
has traditionally functioned in line with US trade legislation.108In this case, US unilateralism was see-
king more market access but also a more effective dispute settlement mechanism, which was already in 
the negotiating mandate of the Uruguay Round. Leaving aside the dubious international legality of such 
unilateral practices, the strategy paradoxically paid off for regime-building, as less powerful countries 
saw the strengthening of the dispute settlement mechanism as a means of helping to restrain US unila-
teralism: ironically, the law of the jungle pursued through the so-called US Section 301 and Super 301 
promoted the consolidation of the rule of law in multilateral trade relations. Indeed, regime-building in 
this area would not have taken place probably without it. In fact, Arthur Dunkel is generally attributed 
with saying that this piece of domestic legislation was the best thing that ever happened to the GATT.109
V. The quest for hard-law
55. To paraphrase Pescatore, the panel system has managed to produce useful reasoned legal 
solutions to the often thorny inter-state tensions regarding world trade.110  The history of the invention 
of the GATT panels evidences the importance of the ‘human factor’ in regime-building generally. As 
mentioned, the negotiations of the Havana Charter laid the foundations for a small global epistemic 
community, highly specialized in nature, with its own and increasingly complex practices as well as 
cultural references and values. In essence, the GATT people basically kept the flame of the world trading 
regime alive, against all odds, for more than half a century. Being aware of this phenomenon allows a 
better understanding of how the GATT has gone from a totally provisional and anemic trade agreement 
to a highly powerful, efficient and sophisticated global regime under the form of WTO.
56. The invention of GATT panels has a starring role in the process, as these had a resounding 
long term success by allowing settling and/or mitigating multiple trade disputes within the four corners 
of the GATT. In doing so, the availability of panels helped not only to reduce trade tensions but also 
made it easier for the GATT community to advance a common rulemaking agenda in the medium and 
long term. As a result, the progressive development of the panels system culminated in the incorpora-
tion of a brand new and unprecedented dispute settlement mechanism in the Final Act of the Uruguay 
Round. To paraphrase Silvia Ostry, this mechanism is ‘the strongest dispute settlement mechanism in the 
history of international law’.111 The negotiations for the instrument began when 92 Contracting Parties 
would formally adopt the Punta del Este Declaration which formally opened negotiations of the Uru-
guay Round (20 September 1986);112 among the 14 negotiating groups, one was concerned exclusively 
with the dispute settlement mechanism.113 
107  See in particular R. Hudec, ‘Thinking about the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil’, Aggressive Unilateralism: 
America’s 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System (University of Michigan Press 1990) at 113-159.
108  G. curZon/V. curZon, ‘GATT: “Traders´ Club”’, The Anatomy of Influence. Decision Making in International Organi-
zation (Yale University Press 1974) at 313. 
109  J. BHagwati, ‘The Diminished Giant Syndrome’, 72 Foreign Affairs 2 (1993): 22–26.
110  P. Pescatore, ‘The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism’, op.cit.p.35. 
111  S. ostry, ‘The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications for future negotiations’, The political econo-
my of international trade law: Essays in honor of Robert. E. Hudec (Cambridge University Press 2002) at 287
112  Doc GATT/1396 (25 September 1986). 
113  T. steward & c. callaHan, The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Dispute Settlement Mech-
anism (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1993).
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57. The Final Act incorporating the results of the Round, signed on 15 April 1994, is the most 
successful of all MTNs held to date. Its advances regarding new disciplines and coverage as well as 
the creation of the WTO are presided over by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); a highly 
technical instrument that amply exceeded the expectations of the negotiators by incorporating key inno-
vations: mainly, (1) the elimination of the positive consensus, (2) the integration of procedures and (3) 
the establishment of a permanent Appellate Body. These changes have been a large step forward in the 
strengthening of world trade governance. 
58. The dispute settlement mechanism today is, to paraphrase the first WTO Director General, 
the heart of the WTO system.114 In almost two decades since its inception, the new mechanism has 
gained a structural position in global governance by producing highly technical legal decisions, which 
are adopted by the WTO General Council −formally acting as Dispute Settlement Body− almost au-
tomatically. Interestingly, however, one critical issue remained somewhat vague in the wording of the 
Understanding, namely the compulsory nature of the reports. Under the GATT of 47, the requirement 
for positive consensus could leave reports in a legal limbo if at least one of the contracting parties did 
not agree with adopting the report.115 On the contrary, under WTO law, panel and Appellate Body re-
ports are to be adopted unless the Dispute Settlement Body decides not to do so by consensus. Hence, 
the requirement has been subtly reversed, from positive... to negative consensus.116 In other words, as 
Komuro puts it, non-adoption of reports has turned into a mere intellectual curiosity.117 In short, adoption 
of reports is de facto automatic.
59. Notwithstanding the above, some legal literature questioned the compulsory nature of re-
ports right after the adoption of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. 
For example, US academics writing in legal journals such as the influential American Journal of 
International Law (AJIL) contended that the Understanding permits a generalized option of either com-
pliance or compensation.118 These positions were strongly contested with celerity in that same journal 
by John Jackson himself, who argued that there is certainly a WTO legal obligation to comply with the 
reports, as well as that compensation is as mere fallback in the event of non-compliance.119 Obviously, 
whether or not this is legally so was a capital question for the nascent WTO regime, and therefore its most 
recognizable academic expressed himself in an unflinching and categorical manner.120 According to Jack-
son, framing the reports as mere recommendations is a misunderstanding, as the practice of the original 
GATT contracting parties assumes that there was an obligation to comply with the terms of panel reports.121 
His words in the editorial comment written for the occasion -under the illustrative title ‘The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation’- are the following: 
‘So what does the DSU language itself say? Here we can examine a good number of clauses, and 
I would suggest that the overall list of those clauses, in the light of the practice of GATT, and perhaps 
114  WTO Focus. Newsletter, August-September (1996) at 7.
115  J. Jackson, ‘The World Trade Organization, op.cit.p.87.
116  See article 16.4 and 17.14 of the Understanding. The literature uses various terms to refer to this amendment: ‘negative 
consensus’, ‘reverse consensus’, etc. 
117  N. koMuro, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Coverage and Procedures of the WTO Understanding’ 29 
Journal of World Trade 4 (1994): 41. 
118  J. bello, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is more’, 90 American Journal of International Law 4 
(1996): 416 and subsequent pages and J. Bello & A. Holmer, ‘Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization Concerns 
and Net Benefits’, 28 International Lawyer 4 (1994): 1103 (compensation as an option for replacing compliance).
119  J. Jackson, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings on the Nature of a Legal Obligation”, 91 
American Journal of International Law 1 (1997): 60-61. For further criticism on the editorial comments of Judith Bello see 
Roessler’s view, as former Director of the GATT Legal Affairs Division, in F. Roessler, ‘Comments: Performance of the System 
IV: Implementation’, 32 International Lawyer (1998): 789-790.    
120  It should be emphasized in any case that compensation in place of compliance is expressly provided for in the specific 
case of non-violation complaints of GATT Article XXIII.b. See Article 26.1.d of the DSU.
121  J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization, op.cit.p.83.
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supplemented by the preparatory work of the negotiators (unfortunately not well documented), strongly 
suggests that the legal effect of an adopted panel report' is the international law obligation to perform the 
recommendation of the panel report’.122 
60. In consequence, the obligation to comply is basically derived from several articles of the 
understanding (namely, articles 3.7, 19.1, 21.6, 22.8 and 26.b): 
123
 
‘Thus, the DSU clearly establishes a preference for an obligation to perform the recommendation; 
notes that the matter shall be kept under surveillance until performance has occurred; indicates that com-
pensation shall be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable; and pro-
vides that in non-violation cases, there is no obligation to withdraw an offending measure, which strongly 
implies that in cases of violation there is an obligation to perform’.124 
61. Notwithstanding these fine arguments, the text of the understanding does not allude in any 
way to the binding nature of the reports; and Jackson himself recognizes this fact: ‘[w]hat can we say 
about the new DSU? Unfortunately, the language of the DSU does not solidly "nail down" this issue’; 
and the scholar later adds: 
‘Oddly enough, some diplomats who assisted in the negotiation of the DSU told me that they 
thought they had nailed it down’.125 
The literal meaning of provisions such as Article 19 (under the heading ‘Panel and Appellate 
Body Recommendations’), for example, are crystal clear: in principle,the reports contain recommen-
dations. However, the established practice has confirmed that such recommendations became binding 
decisions once they had been adopted by the General Council acting as Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
In practice, the originally debatable nature of panel and Appellate Body reports has been closed in favor 
of their binding nature, once these have been adopted by the DSB.126 Hence, at the end of the day, the 
mechanics of international customary law came to the rescue of WTO regime-building for the occasion. 
62. In fact, international legal literature is currently pacific regarding the binding nature of re-
ports adopted by the DSB.127 
Today, the highly consolidated interplay between practice and opinio iuris on this issue allows 
WTO Members to frame DSB adopted reports as legally binding. However, any person unfamiliar with 
these intricacies (including lawyers) would have serious difficulties in understanding this development, 
as she/he could always read the word ‘recommendation’ in the legal texts. Hence, it would certainly have 
been desirable for the Understanding to nail down such a critical issue, provided that binding nature 
appeared to be the intention of the negotiators. 
63. In any case, after decades of consensual practices within the panels system, the negotiating 
working group on dispute settlement in the Uruguay Round (presided over by Julio Lacarte-Muró) 
managed to go far beyond this by completing the drafting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understan-
122  J. Jackson, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement, op.cit.p.62-63.
123  In a later text, Jackson reinforces his argument adding new provisions to the list (article 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 11, 19.1, 21.1, 21.6, 
22.1, 22.2, 22.8 y 26.1b). See J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization, op.cit.p.87, note 82. <0}
124  See J. Jackson, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings’, op.cit.p.62.
125  Ibid: 62.
126  See Article 20 of the DSU (Time-frame for DSB Decisions)
127  See, for example, R. Hudec, ‘Broadening the Scope of Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement’, Improving WTO 
Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues & Lessons from the Practice of Other International Courts and Tribunals, (Cameron 
May 2000) at 345-376 or A. Sykes, ‘The Remedy for Breach of Obligations Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing: Damages or Specific Performance?’ New Directions in International Economic Law: Essays in Honor of John H. Jackson 
(Kluwer Law International 2000) at 347-51.
Level up: a history of regime-building at Gatt ClubPablo ZaPatero Miguel
838Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Octubre 2020), Vol. 12, Nº 2, pp. 818-839
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt - DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2020.5632
ding.128 To paraphrase Shell, the new system represented a resounding victory for the legalists in the 
debate over the dispute settlement model for multilateral trade.129  In fact, as a result of that, nowadays, 
the transition from the GATT to the WTO is seen by many observers as a full shift from soft-law to hard-
law. For Abbott, for example, evidence of this trend is clearly perceptible in two areas: ‘The first area 
is progressive refinement of the rules from the general to the specific. The second is the transformation 
from a system for resolving differences to one based on a quasi-judicial system of consensus’.130 
64 Today, the functioning of panels and the Appellate Body is governed by strict application 
of WTO law. The strong diplomatic approach of some panels from the GATT era has been left behind. 
The legal approach has won over those critics identifying law and legal institutions with rigidity and in-
flexibility and, in consequence, as tools unsuitable for the institutional specificities of progressive trade 
liberalization.131 In the early years of the diplomatic approach, as Jackson recalls, the GATT was merely 
a ‘negotiating forum’ designed substantially to retain a balance of concessions and advantages between 
the Contracting Parties.132. Nowadays, the world trading system builds upon such forum to go beyond, 
by establishing a dynamic regulatory forum which rules are justiciable in practice. 
65. However some elements of the diplomatic approach still continue to hold sway when resol-
ving disputes. In fact, some remain in the current provisions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
itself. Thus, even though today the mechanism is hyper-formalized, it preserves some diplomatic ele-
ments that pay tribute to the tradition and old-school culture of world trade diplomacy. In this way, the 
DSU maintains diplomatic elements which are considered useful.133.  For example, the terms of reference 
for panels are defined by bilateral negotiation. At the same time, the parties engage in a re-examination 
phase prior to obtain a final decision on the cases. Also the DSU still contains the old GATT provisions 
relating to obtaining a ‘mutually acceptable’ solution as well as the maintenance of a ‘balance of rights 
and obligations’. These elements, as Pescatore suggests, are very close to conciliation.134 In this regard, 
conciliation was the privileged mode of resolving disputes in the world trading system in the pre-WTO 
phase,135 and that culture certainly did not vanished in the WTO legal texts. In consequence, several  
formulas related to conciliation have been retained.136 In short, regime-building in the area of dispute 
settlement advanced towards hyper-legalism without dispensing with at least some functional elements 
of its diplomatic inheritance. 
66. Today, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is not strictly speaking a judicial instrument, 
given that it comprises a number of ad hoc bodies together with one permanent body −panels and Appe-
llate Body respectively− the reports of which require, as explained, approval by the DSB. In this regard, 
although the establishment of panels and the approval of reports is now automatic in practice −rejection 
requiring collective negative consensus−, both decisions still require adoption by the General Council, ac-
ting as DSB. However, the Appellate Body has imprinted a strong judicial orientation in its procedures and 
128  T. stewart/ c. callaHan, The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992). Dispute Settlement Mecha-
nism (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1993).
129  R. sHell, ‘Trade legalism, op.cit.p.833.
130  F. Abbott, ‘Incomplete Rule Systems, System Incompatibilities and Suboptimal Solutions: Changing the Dynamic of 
Dispute Settlement and Avoidance in Trade Relations Between Japan and the United States’, 16 Arizona Journal of Interna-
tional and Comparative Law (1999): 195-196.
131  In defence of this perception see, specially, O. Long, Law and its Limitations, op.cit.p.21 and 73 and K. Dam, The GATT 
Law, op.cit.p.358.
132  J. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of international economic relations (MIT Press 1997) at 93.
133  Evidently, this is not exclusive of the WTO. On this, see in particular M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Institu-
tional Analysis (University of Chicago Press 1981) at 8 and 15.
134   P. Pescatore, ‘The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism’, op.cit.pp.37-38. <0}
135  E. canal Forgues, L’Institution de la conciliation dans le cadre du GATT: Contributions a l’etude de la structuration 
d’une mecanisme de reglement des differends (Bruylant 1993).
136  See E. canal Forgues, ‘Le système de règlemend des différends de l'OMC’, La réorganisation mondiale des échanges 
(Pedone 1996) at 285.
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rulings since the very first case was appealed in 1995. Thus, there is a wide consensus among world trade 
experts on the judicialization of world trade dispute settlement.137. As a result, the policy space for diploma-
cy/negotiation under such terms is not only inside but outside the mechanism, as WTO dispute settlement 
functions by default. Therefore, it would be reasonable to argue that diplomacy was not annulled but trans-
formed by the current rule-based approach into rule-based diplomacy. That is, in practice, WTO rules and 
decisions have become strong arguments in bilateral trade relations nowadays, as the shadow of the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism facilitates finding mutually acceptable solutions and arrangements. 
137  For some first reflections on this issue with regard to the GATT regime, see G. MalinVerni, Les Reglements des differ-
ends dans les organisations internacionales economiques, (IHHEI 1974) at 171. 
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